tl;dr: errybody loves the /24, but we still use other VLSNs.
The USA unemployment news today is twice as grim as it was last week: 6.6 million more unemployed, bringing unemployment to 9.9% in just two weeks. More hard numbers are coming, and that means all businesses need to revisit their HR standards.
Do NOT Mind the Gap: jobs have been lost through no fault of the employees, or even the firms they’ve worked for. When you see that the last job worked ended around the time the pandemic hit hard, don’t ask about it. Don’t worry about it, either.
This means also making sure the algorithms used to find resumes are tuned to not look for employment gaps. If you ask me, the best algorithms are real people looking at real applications and making reasonable decisions to arrange interviews based on common sense. When algorithms sort through resumes, they have blinders on. They can’t see what certifications are equivalent to the ones they’re told to look for. They don’t know what lines of work are very close to the experience desired. Humans can figure out that stuff. And if you think I’m encouraging the use of people and the discontinuation of automated job boards, you’re absolutely right. If you’ve got jobs that have gone unfilled for months with automated resume screeners, it’s time to go back to the humans again.
Keep Your Friends Close, and Keep Your IT Closer: When we have staff that’s worked somewhere for years, they know things that only people who worked there for years would know. No outsourcer can match that. If you treat those IT workers with respect and consideration, you’ll keep that knowledge and expertise in your firm. That’s not just good for productivity, it’s good for security. They will know where the holes are and which ones are most important to patch up and repair. If they have a long-term stake in your firm, they’ll be ready to point out what needs work, and they won’t try to charge you extra for items not on the SoW.
Contractors CAN Become FTEs: If you have a rule against hiring contractors for full-time positions, written or unwritten, get rid of that rule. With the massive layoffs, lots of IT people may have to pick up a contract here or there to make ends meet while they search for their next FTE role. Lots of contractors have been trapped by senseless no-contractor rules that would be excellent assets as FTEs in your firm. And those excellent assets are going to be on top of things which brings us back to security. It’s much better to have a security role filled by a former contractor than to have that role unfilled because of a, frankly, nonsense rule.
No Experience Means NEW Experience: If someone has a general IT background and is interested in a security role, don’t shy away. If you’re about to take on a new project with a new technology, that candidate knows as much about the new technology as everyone else in your firm: that is to say, nothing. They’re going to learn just like everyone else would, so why not let that person start there? That person with no security experience is a good choice for getting some new experience.
Training Is Compensation, Not an Expense: IT pros *want* training. When your firm cuts the training budget, that’s like cutting their salaries. When your firm promises one course per year, that’s a great thing. But if a person asks for a week off to take the course and gets told to maybe consider doing online learning on their own time, that’s a beatdown. I know we have to consider remote learning options during the pandemic, but a live teacher is so much better for interaction than a recorded training film. Keep them in vendor courses and general courses – and there’s lots of security training out there – and you’ll keep your IT pros not only happy where they are, but eagerly soliciting their contacts to apply for openings at your firm when they open up.
The city of New Orleans just got attacked and that made me think of the song about a train by the same name, whose chorus opens with that line… but this time, the question lacks the soft charm and slow nostalgia of Steve Goodman’s folk song. This time, the question is cold, jarring, unnerving. It’s not the first major US city to be attacked and made to be dark and it won’t be the last. The cities and other local governments of the USA simply aren’t going to be able to deal with cyberattacks on their own, so they’re going to be target-rich environments for state actors and the criminals they hire to detonate hand grenades to cover their tracks… or just the criminals who blow things up, you never can tell.
We can tell the cities and counties and states of the USA all we want about security and be met with the tired, nodding heads and empty eyes of IT staff that tried to tell the same message to their higher-ups. They know. They’re not idiots. They’re just faced with small budgets and political imperatives to get stuff done, no matter what. They know that when their town / county / state experiences a major breach, it will lead to the first time that entity seriously considered spending time and money on security measures. It will lead to the first time IT is allowed to do what it knows needs to be done, even if it’s done on top of the rubble and ruin of the past.
Do they have a perimeter firewall? Sure, but there was the time somebody high up got mad about traffic being blocked, so it’s set to permit all traffic by default. Do they have a datacenter firewall? Yes, indeed, right here in this box in the storeroom. It is fresh and ready to go. Do they have antivirus running on every PC? Absolutely. Well, we can only tell for sure on PCs that have antivirus running on them… we don’t know about the ones that have fallen out of communication with our software maintenance platforms.
Need I continue? Some of you are already at the point where you can bear the horror no more, but I must press on! You must see more, that you know the depths of their helplessness! Do you see the unsecured Internet line in that office, terminating on a Windows server with RDP running, no limit on logon attempts? Do you see the flat network, with telnet still running on switches and routers? Do you see massive file shares with no permissions set to halt normal users from deleting or changing files? Do you see the backup server that constantly fails its nightly backups, with the backup operator simply clicking through the errors on his shift because he was told long ago to just ignore them? Do you see the gear that all respond to the SNMP community “public”?
And there is more horror in there, I say. I didn’t even get to the Windows NT 4.0 server that’s still on the network. Why? Well, the payroll application couldn’t upgrade to run on Windows 2000, so we keep it going on that server over there… and there is yet more, deeper and deeper into hell.
Who knows what static routes lurk deep within the network, routes that bypass the firewall entirely for special IP addresses in faraway lands where US lacks extradition rights? And are there programs on unsuspected and unsuspecting systems that are just counting down the days until the dust settles, things revert to normal, and the problems of the past make themselves available for mayhem once again? Clean up all you want, but what do you do if that payroll server on NT 4.0 is infected? The only person who can rebuild that system died 3 years ago. If it’s infected, maybe we can just put it behind a firewall and only open the ports needed for Windows and Active Directory. Oh wait, that’s all of them…
So what is the solution? Is this where the federal government steps in and supplements the IT budgets of local government entities? Or would that lead only to swollen management salaries with pittances spent on actual new technical hires? Is this where the feds create a system of firewalls to filter all traffic entering and leaving the nation, such as the Chinese do?
Actually, that might be what we need. It wouldn’t do anything for completely domestic attacks, but it could do at least something to halt attacks from outside the USA, right?
Except… how do we know the difference between legitimate traffic from abroad and traffic with malicious intent? Encryption doesn’t allow one to peek into the packets very easily. Banning known bad source IP addresses just leads to attackers compromising systems with other IP addresses and then launching attacks from there.
But maybe the protection is on the outbound side, with a massive proxy server cutting communications with scam sites and other evil online in other countries. But for how long would the proxy server be protecting us only from malware and fraud? Wouldn’t law enforcement argue that we need to be protected from terrorist propaganda? How broad is that classification? Wouldn’t entertainment firms want to protect us from download sites? Would they also want to “protect” us from foreign entertainment outlets that didn’t allow them to act as middlemen brokers for their content? Would we also be “protected” from foreign news sources that didn’t go along with the administration’s views? Blocking Russian state news propaganda I wouldn’t mind, but I sure would mind if a CBC or BBC investigative journalism programme that was critical of a US firm or governmental policy was blocked.
I hate to suggest this, as it’s highly exploitative, but we could allow recent grads to learn IT and then work for pathetic, near-volunteer wages for local government entities in order to pay off their student debts. I hesitate to introduce a scheme to offer pardons for nonviolent offenders that do pro bono IT work, since fraud and cyberattacks are, themselves, nonviolent crimes…
The City of New Orleans owns Louis Armstrong International Airport. Did this recent attack penetrate into the airport? Or was the firewall that is supposed to sequester it also permitting all traffic because there’s a full trust between its AD domain and the City’s? Or for some other reason, I don’t care. It’s all a nightmare, and when I wake up, there’s some shadow moving across my screen, saying, “g00d m0rn1ng 4m3r1c4, h0w r u?”
I don’t know how to answer that question. I normally don’t want to curse the darkness without lighting a candle, but I’m at a loss for answers to all the questions I asked. Cyberattacks can produce near-nuclear results, if done on a sufficient scale and with intent to destroy, not just encrypt and demand ransom. Perhaps lasers and hypersonic missiles can defend the USA from sudden attacks launched from bombers, ICBM silos, or nuclear submarines. What good are those against cyberattacks that target our highly vulnerable small government entities?
More than once, I’ve been in the meeting where someone is questioning whether or not to get a particular security system. This someone asks, “OK, so if someone has the CEO at gunpoint and forces him to log in to his PC and then takes pictures of the documents visible on his screen, then blackmails the CEO to say nothing to the local police as he slips away into the shadows and to a foreign nation where extradition is difficult, will you be able to stop that data exfiltration?”
And then that someone crosses arms and boldly states, “Then why bother with all this trouble if it’s useless against a *real* hacker?”
Now, maybe it’s not exactly that scenario. But whatever’s offered up is an advanced use case that even the tightest of security nets would have trouble catching. And if the current state of the IT environment is where someone could bring a PC from home and copy all the files off the main server, maybe that group of advanced use cases isn’t what anyone should be worrying about right now.
Which is why it’s important to consider such exotic cases, but rate them for what they are – exotic. When someone brings up a basic use case that is well within the capabilities of the security product to restrict, rate that as a basic case that will be among the first to be dealt with as the system is introduced. As the system matures, then the more mature cases can be considered.
I deal with NAC in my role, so I see the range of use cases all the time in my meetings with customers. Block a PC that isn’t part of your firm? This is not difficult to do. Block someone spoofing the MAC address of a printer? Well, that’s more than a basic task. I have to ask how we can tell a legitimate printer apart from a spoofed device. If there is no way to tell, then we have to ask if it’s possible to treat all printers as outsiders and restrict their access. This is where maturity comes into consideration.
Maybe we just proceed forward with the PC use case and think some more about that printer issue. Perhaps once we have the PC use case dealt with, there may have been time enough to set up an SNMPv3 credential to use to log on to legitimate printers. Maybe there was enough time to determine how to set up printer VLANs and restrict them. If so, then we’re ready to deal with that printer issue. While we’re doing that, we could be thinking about how to handle the security camera issue, or something like that.
Each environment will have different levels of maturity for their use cases. Perhaps at one firm, it is easier to deal with securing PCs than it is with MacOSs. At the next one, they could have a better handle on their MacOS management than they do with PCs. Maturity could simply be deciding between equally-difficult tasks about which one will be done first.
Maturity can also be seen in calling out when a use case goes beyond the capabilities of the product under consideration. A proxy server does not provide its own physical security system, for example. So, if we entertain scenarios in which physical security is defeated, we should be tabling those until we’re looking at a physical security system. By the same token, if for a scenario to be plausible another security system has to be defeated, then that begs an argument about the safeguards and durability of the system that has to be defeated, not the one under current consideration.
We also see maturity in getting different systems to work together. Being able to automate responses from one system to another gives firms the ability to deal with increasingly advanced threats. All the while, as long as we keep a perspective on how mature our security systems are, we know what level of threat we can deal with.
There’s an old Robert Frost poem, ‘Mending Wall’, that I’d like to
pirate draw inspiration from and make a few adaptations to, if you don’t mind…
Something there is that doesn’t love firewalls,
That opens the ports, many and varied,
And spews out the code in plain text in prod;
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.
The developers’ work’s another thing:
I have come after them and made repair
Where they have left not one single port blocked,
But they would have the code loaded straight to prod,
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,
No one has seen them made or heard them made,
But at spring audit-time we find them there.
I let my neighbor know in the next cube;
And on a day we meet to read configs
And set firewalls between us once again.
We keep firewalls between us as we go.
To each open ports that have opened to each.
And some are ranges and some are in groups
We have to use a spell to keep them all closed:
‘Stay where you are until our backs are turned!’
We wear our fingers rough with scrolling down.
Oh, just another dull video game,
I call out the new insecurities
There where it is we all need those firewalls:
Where contractors connect to prod boxes
Where file servers sit, shares all exposed
To outsiders’ eyes. And we accept risk.
He just says, ‘Good firewalls make good neighbors.’
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
‘Why do they make good neighbors? Isn’t it
Where they segment traffic?’ But no segments,
No zones define our flat, inner network
Contractors here mixed with outsourcers there,
Aren’t firewalls and segments for those neighbors?
Something there is that doesn’t love firewalls,
That wants it down. I could say ‘Scrums’ to him,
But it’s not scrums exactly, and I’d rather
He said it for himself. I see him there
Auditing a rule that’s permit all all
The CISO told him to accept the risk.
He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his CISO’s saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
Once again, ‘Good firewalls make good neighbors.’
Nick Vendor poked his head into the office, via a door left open. Nobody was in the office, but the time was 10:00, and Nick had a 10 o’clock meeting in Cecil Oh’s office, so Nick went in and got comfortable.
Getting comfortable meant sitting in the chair closest to the wall and angling it so that he could see both Cecil’s desk and the door to the office. Nick was a security pro, and was paid to be paranoid.
A few minutes after ten, Cecil Oh bustled in and smiled at Nick, “Sorry I’m late, but you know how it is.”
Nick nodded. Everyone from manager on up was always running late, everywhere he went. A CISO at big company was certainly no exception.
Just behind Cecil was Dirk Rector, the IT Director, and Cissy Tantisso, the assistant CISO. Cissy closed the door behind her and all sat in chairs around Cecil’s desk.
Cecil answered two emails and then said, “OK, sorry about that delay, but here we go. We’re here to meet with Nick Vendor here, who is going to give us his network health check assessment. He’s been scanning and probing for a few days, so we’re all eager to hear what he’s found.”
Nick smiled through that “eager to hear” part. Everyone’s eager to hear, but not everyone is so eager to have had heard. There was always at least some bad news in a network health check assessment. Today, the amount of bad news was somewhat more than just “some”.
Cecil held his hands towards Nick and said, “It’s all yours, sir.”
Nick nodded, smiled, and did his best to front-load the cushiony stuff. “Thanks very much, Cecil, and thanks of course to Cissy and Dirk for all the cooperation you and your teams have provided me in this past week. I really do appreciate all the work they’ve done to help me. They certainly helped me to have a little fun as I did my assessment and they were more than helpful in providing me with information about different device types and systems you have installed here at Amalgamated Potrzebie. They’ve been a great help.”
Cissy, Dirk, and Cecil all nodded in appreciation of Nick’s thanks.
Nick shifted in his chair. “So, let’s get to the numbers. About 70% or so of your Windows PCs are managed in SCCM and a similar percentage are up to date on their AV. Dirk’s got the action to follow up with the desktop team to close the gap with the other 30%.
“Macintosh systems, there’s only a few hundred of those, but they’re all pretty much managed centrally. There were, like, 10, that weren’t. We know where they are and Dirk’s Mac team will follow up on those. It’s just a small office, right?”
Dirk agreed. “It’s a marketing team in our Pittsburgh campus, that’s correct.”
Everyone took a deep breath for Linux. They all knew they had a problem there, but they still had to hear about it.
“Linux… well, these developers have not yet embraced the idea that they have to install a security client on their test boxes.”
Dirk objected. “Well, hold on there. That client doesn’t work on all flavors of Linux.”
Cissy said, “We need to stop using those flavors, then. We can’t have developers deciding what risks we accept.”
Cecil grinned, “Yeah, if someone else says ‘I’ll accept the risk’, what am I here for?”
As she finished chuckling, Cissy said, “I’ll take the to-do for getting dev to standardize on Linux.”
Nick said, “Good. That will go a long way towards getting Linux in line.” He took a deep breath, deeper than the one for Linux. “That brings us to embedded devices. We’ll start with embedded Windows, the badge readers at the entrances first. Those devices are active on the O-Sheet Botnet, nearly all of them. The botnet software listens on port 80, HTTP, and determines if it’s botnet communications or if it should hand off to the legit software that uses HTTP. So, if we block port 80, we block both the botnet and the device, which means nobody gets in at that location.”
Cecil sat forward. “Wait, what? A botnet?”
“Yes sir. A botnet in practically all your badge readers. It can infect other devices from those badge readers, as well. That’s basically where the local command and control software is located. Your IPS will block north-south traffic, so it won’t get to the data center, but the east-west stuff is wide open.”
Cecil sat back. “Recommendation?”
Nick grimaced. “Honestly? Rip them all out and get a new system, one that either doesn’t use port 80 or one that doesn’t use a network connection at all. These were all installed with the vendor’s default admin credentials still active, which is probably how they were able to be compromised.”
“Any way to remediate in place?”
Nick shook his head. “It’s embedded legacy Windows. No way to really get in there and make any changes unless we’ve got our own red team to write custom code to pop the devices and clean out the malware. Even then, there could be another zero-day exploit that comes to light and then you’re back to where you are now. And this is just the start.”
Cecil had a panicky tone to his voice. “Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa – give me the big numbers, let’s start with that.”
“Amalgamated Potrzebie has a large number of industrial and security control devices that show indicators of compromise. Close to 40% of your IoT devices are showing signs of compromise.”
Dirk asked, “How many of those are on our production floors?”
Nick looked at his spreadsheet, did a quick bit of math in his head. “Maybe 20-25% of your production systems are compromised, but the compromised devices tend to be concentrated in certain facilities. You’ve got most that are still clean, but a good chunk that are shot through-” Nick corrected his language. “- showing about 80-90% compromised.” It was important to leave out hyperbolic adjectives when delivering news of this magnitude.
Dirk’s next question: “Any of those compromised lines in Council Bluffs or Little Rock?” Cecil and Cissy looked at each other with trepidation. Those were the facilities with Defense contracts.
Dirk spoke to Cecil and Cissy. “We have got to get those cleaned out, as soon as possible. We can’t keep our contracts with that kind of threat active in the environment.”
Cissy responded, “Hold on, we don’t even know what’s compromised in those locations. Nick?”
Nick looked over the list. “Temperature gauges, badge readers, security cameras, the time clocks, well time clocks just in Council Bluffs – Little Rock clocks are fine, um… the digital signage is infected, as are the smart light bulbs in the Woodbridge building in Little Rock… ummm… oh, crap.”
Cecil didn’t like that. “Excuse me?”
“I didn’t see this earlier, and I apologize for that oversight, but all your Philly switches on the production floors are basically being run by a group outside of AP.”
“There’s a feature on those models to allow for easier automatic upgrading, but it’s vulnerable to an attack. Basically, send a packet to the port used for auto-upgrade and you get a root prompt. We can’t access the devices, but there’s a stream of traffic running between those boxes and a TOR node.”
Cecil didn’t believe it. “No way, we block all manufacturing traffic from the Internet. It’s a segmented environment.”
Nick held up his hand. “It’s not segmented. There’s a vendor-owned Windows 2008 server that bridges traffic between those lines and the Internet. It’s basically on a DSL line and hasn’t been patched since 2010.”
“Who’s paying for the DSL line?”
Nick shrugged his shoulders. “Probably whoever paid for it in 2010 and then never did a budget review since then. At any rate, we recommend not turning off the server, since we don’t know what happens when the communication line is severed. You could wind up losing your switches and maybe other production line equipment that’s connected to them. As for the Philly switches, I do have a note here to check the rest of your sites for this issue. I just didn’t have enough time to finish that part before our meeting here.”
“OK, well, I’m going to want you to follow up our discussion here with a complete check of those Philly switches.” Cecil felt a pit opening up in his stomach.
Dirk and Cissy looked at him for guidance, with Cissy asking, “So what do we do about the compromised Defense lines?”
Cecil looked at his desk. “We need to go up the chain on this one. We have to let DoD know that the lines are compromised, but at the same time, they may accept the risk and let us keep producing parts. We’ve got a lot of pressure to fill the quotas they’ve set for us.”
Nick asked, “Should I still be in this room for that discussion?”
Cecil thought about what the lines in Council Bluffs and Little Rock were turning out. On the one hand, the independent, armed, unmanned aerial vehicles were some seriously top secret items. Nick shouldn’t be privy to that information.
On the other hand, Cecil felt like he had to know if those IAUAVs were themselves compromised… “Well, Nick, that depends. Do you have a security clearance?”
Dirk looked a little aghast. “How was he able to do this survey, then?”
Cecil flopped back in his chair. “Apparently, we’ve got a few blind spots around here as regards security…”
If the country were ever faced with an immediate threat of cyberattack, a copy of this booklet would be impossible to distribute to every household as part of a public information campaign. There are so many media platforms, we have no idea which one or ones to use that would, in their combination, reach all households. Moreover, even if we got the booklet out, how would we make sure that people actually read it? Let’s face it, attention spans are not what they were in the 80s, when all we were worried about were nuclear missiles and bombs.
If the country were attacked by a wide-ranging cyberattack, we do not know what targets will be chosen or how severe the assault would be. We probably couldn’t even imagine what would be attacked, so we’re rather certain that there will be critical flaws in this plan because of faulty assumptions made that a particular service would be available or that help would be on its way to those in distress.
If cyberattacks are used on a large scale, those of us living in rural areas would be potentially exposed to as much risk as those in urban areas. Supply chain disruption could deprive all areas of critical resources such as food, medical supplies, fuel, and so on. Service disruption could mean that sectors of the country would not have basic police, fire, and/or emergency protection. We like to think that the emergency response system is hardened against attack, but the truth is that that system is quite vulnerable in many areas. It is likely that some emergency systems are still managed via insecure methods and would be easily compromised by a large-scale cyberattack. This could also mean that alarm systems would be on constantly, without interruption, producing high levels of mental stress.
The dangers which you and your family will face in this situation might not be reduced if you do as this booklet describes, but at least you won’t be as surprised about what goes down as someone who hasn’t read this booklet.
READ THIS BOOKLET WITH CARE. IF YOU RECEIVE AN ELECTRONIC COPY, PRINT IT OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BEFORE YOUR HOME NETWORK, POSSIBLY INCLUDING YOUR PRINTER, IS COMPROMISED BY THE ENEMY.
1. Challenge to Survival
Everything that is connected to the Internet during a cyberattack will potentially be damaged, destroyed, or weaponized.
Any device connected to a network that is itself connected to the Internet is at risk of complete or partial data loss. While personal data loss may be limited to items of a sentimental nature and locally-managed personal data, public and corporate data loss could potentially result in wiping of individual records. These records would potentially be those used to justify access to products and services, both public and private. Because it is cost-prohibitive to retain hard copies of these records, we recommend that you retain a hard copy of a volume of Stoic philosophy, Seneca being a good example of such, so that you can endure your losses with dignity. It is likely that restoring lost data would involve a process at least as long as used when it was first created, likely a longer process due to the need to utilize pen, paper, typewriter, and processes that we as a nation have largely abandoned due to our digitalization.
Any device with an Internet connection is also at risk of being rendered completely useless by way of having its software wiped or corrupted. Such devices would not be able to be updated by their vendors, either via the Internet or via hands-on methods. While loss of function for home thermostats would result in substantial discomfort, loss of function for medical devices and potentially refrigeration devices could lead to sudden or eventual loss of life. While we cannot advise that all persons immediately exchange “smart” medical devices for non-Internet connected equivalents, we do advise that persons with “smart” medical devices consult with their trusted medical specialists about the feasibility of eventually replacing such devices. As for persons who rely upon refrigeration to preserve medical supplies, we strongly recommend not using a “smart” refrigerator and that they maintain a power supply independent of the local grid, with sufficient fuel to last for 2-3 days. Maybe 4. Or 5. Or 6. 7, tops. Well, 8-12 in a severe case. 13-21 in a worst-case scenario. Could be a month or two, really, before services get restored if the attackers keep following up with additional exploits. Maybe even up to a year, when we think about it. Don’t want anyone to panic, but, yeah, we’re that vulnerable.
While it is possible that a cyberattacker would utilize connected devices to intercept domestic communications, we consider such a scenario to be low risk. We are more concerned about an attacker exploiting vulnerabilities in connected devices that would cause them to malfunction to the point where they would be potential fire and/or explosive hazards. To minimize this risk, we recommend that citizens unplug – not just turn off, but unplug – all electronic devices not in use. This includes unplugging them from the Internet. This also includes unplugging devices that do not connect to the Internet, as it is possible an attacker could weaponize the power grid to send a power surge to a residence, with the intent of creating chaos and confusion.
Under no circumstances should a citizen consider operating a motor vehicle during a major cyberattack. Even if your personal vehicle is not Internet-capable, you cannot say the same for the other vehicles on the road, nor can that be said for your municipality’s traffic control systems.
If you have a home alarm system, disconnect it as soon as you have advance warning of a cyberattack or become aware that such an attack is underway. This disconnection will need to include the battery back-up system for the home alarm system. The concern here is that the attacker will create chaos and confusion by triggering the alarm. The constant noise of the alarm would both render the home unusable as a shelter as well as lead to mental strain for one’s neighbors. Triggering home alarms across a wide area would also overload emergency response systems, if those haven’t also gone down in the original attack.
In the event of a cyberattack, remove all batteries from smartphones, tablets, and cell phones so that those devices cannot be weaponized, as described above.
We’re pretty sure we left something off this list that will result in massive injury and loss of life. In our defense, there are so many Internet-connected devices, we can’t even begin to imagine how to protect against all possible situations in which they could be compromised and/or weaponized. The guy in the cubicle next to me just mentioned something about Internet-connected cat boxes. Again, if this was 1980, we wouldn’t have to face such a scenario. But this is 2018, so we may very well have a cat box-related tragedy befall our nation in a major cyberattack.
2. Planning for Survival
Stay at Home
The title of this section is reassuring, more so than the more accurate “Stay Near Home, Possibly in a Public Shelter, Unless Those Are Also Compromised in the Attack.” If your home isn’t rendered unusable due to your domestic devices being shut down, incapacitated, or weaponized, you will have as good a place as any to ride out the attack.You may die there, cold, hungry, dehydrated, and exhausted, but wouldn’t you rather die at home than on the street or in some wilderness? It’s your call, but at least if you die at home, it’ll be easier to notify your next of kin, assuming we can get communications systems back online and are not overwhelmed by local casualties.
Anticipate complete disruption of electrical, water, natural gas, and sewage utilities and plan accordingly. “Plan accordingly” is really a cop-out. We have no idea how every family in a major urban area would be able to arrange resources to cope with such a disruption in services (unless of course, they find the best dual fuel deals here). Especially families in apartment complexes, and doubly so for those receiving public housing assistance. Good lord, they might riot within 72 hours as the food in the local stores is exhausted. But where will you go? It’s not like these riots will be localized. I’m looking right now at a scenario in which the national distribution network is knocked offline for two weeks, and the carnage will be awful. So, yes, do stay at home. It will help you preserve your strength for the coming armageddon.
Plan a Refuge
If you can adopt a pre-industrial lifestyle where you raise your own food without the aid of mechanization, chemical fertilizers, or modern distribution networks, the sooner the better. Of course, that also means exposing yourself to diseases that pretty much exist only in developing nations and history books, so there’s a bit of a trade-off there. You could go with getting a year’s supply of food and a local water gathering system, but there may actually be laws in your area that make water gathering illegal. As for the food, that’s a major expense, so you can’t ramp it up all at once. Basically, if you don’t have a refuge now, you may be too late. Don’t panic, however. There is still plenty of time to print off the public-domain works of a Stoic philosopher so that you can endure these hardships with dignity.
If you live in a tiny house with a chemical toilet, you may be better off than most at first. Nobody here envies you for the task of replenishing that toilet, should the distribution network still be down when the time comes.
Plan Your Survival Kit
Stock enough food and water for 14 days. Why 14 days? We have no idea, but if it was good enough for the people who wrote the pamphlet on how to survive nuclear war, it’s good enough for us. Each person should drink two pints a day, so that means 3.5 gallons per person. I can’t do metric, so you’re on your own there. This water is for drinking. You’ll need twice as much per person for washing, and we’re not talking about showers or baths, either. You’re going to get rather grimy in the event of a major cyberattack.
Choose foods that can be eaten cold and that will also keep fresh, such as cans of soup or beans. You will likely want to practice eating soup straight out of the can now so that you can discover which flavors you prefer best and so that you learn to suppress your gag reflexes, should they be evident while consuming such a meal. The cold soup you eat today may mean cyberattack survival tomorrow!
Heaven help you if you have a baby or special dietary requirements. You are going to suffer grievously.
In the past, a radio would be one’s only link with the outside world, but even emergency and commercial radio systems can be disrupted in a major cyberattack. You might as well get a hand-cranked radio and try it out from time to time, in case we get lucky and manage to restore radio services.
Make sure you have plenty of warm clothing, first aid supplies, cutlery, dishes, and a can opener. Nobody wants to be the chump that stocked up on canned goods, only to forget a can opener. Better get several, just in case one breaks.
You will also find sleeping bags, flashlights, camp stoves (be sure to have the proper fuel and ventilation for these), spare batteries, toilet articles, and buckets to be very useful. You will also want a shovel and a location at least 20 feet away from your home where you can bury your solid biological waste. You would want this to be in an area that is not exposed to rain runoff or the local water table, as it will be a source of disease.
Also have tissues, notebooks, pencils, brushes, cleaning materials, plastic or rubber gloves, toys, reading material (including the Stoic philosophy that will help you cope), a mechanical wind-up clock, and a calendar.
Finally, in advance of a cyberattack or as one is underway, it may be advisable to shut off gas, electricity, and water services at the utility shut-off point so that damage to those systems will not compromise your shelter.
3. Protect and Survive
In the 1980s, we could discuss the methods of warning about an imminent nuclear attack. Such warning would be available in the case of a bomber attack or ICBM launch. We did not talk much about a submarine-launched missile attack, as those would have far less time between missile launch, missile detection, and missile target impact. We would basically know about the attack right before it took place.
In the event of a wide-ranging cyberattack, we may not know about the attack until some time has passed after the initial phases of the attack have been completed and the secondary phases of the attack commence. It is also possible that the cyberattack targets the warning systems themselves, so that they emit one or more false warnings to crate chaos and confusion and mental stress – or so that the warning systems do not function at all, as a prelude to a nuclear weapons attack by way of bombers, ICBMs, and/or submarine-launched missiles.
That last one would be the worst possible scenario. No warning, all major cities and quite a few minor ones all hit at the same time. The enemy wouldn’t dream of doing that, however, unless it also had managed to deprive us of our ability to use our nuclear weapons in that cyberattack. Since the enemy has been very persistent in attempting to penetrate our cyberdefenses, we can’t rule out that they might gain that upper hand and then launch the attack that effectively destroys our nation at little or no risk to their nation and/or allies.
It’s also possible that the enemy nation merely launch the cyberattack to deprive us of our nuclear weapons, with the intent of capturing and controlling our industrial base and natural resources. It is possible that the enemy nation would change the function of industrial security systems to keep loyal workers locked out, so as to prevent acts of sabotage to prevent industry from falling into their hands.
The same enemy nation may also be interested in disrupting the supply chain so as to induce mass panic, protest, and rioting. In the resultant die-off, our population would be too weakened by civil unrest and famine to mount an effective, coordinated resistance.
If, for some reason, our national leaders miscalculate on a massive scale and have to resort to a launch of nuclear weapons as a last-ditch measure, it is quite likely that the enemy nation will launch a wide-ranging cyberattack in conjunction with a discharge of its nuclear weapons, so as to take us down to hell with them. I know I said that a situation described above would be the worst case, now I’m not so sure.
We’ve so far attributed wide-ranging cyberattacks to enemy nations, but we also have to consider the possibility of the attacks originating from a non-nation-state actor, an internal threat, or as a result of pure accident. In such cases, we estimate that the impact of the attack would not be as comprehensive as described above, but could still incapacitate one or more major utilities and/or public services.
Holy crap, I haven’t even thought about air traffic control systems or airports until just now. If there’s a major cyberattack, pray that you’re not in the skies, should those systems be compromised.
Same goes for commuter rail and metro systems. I’m getting sick, just thinking about those.
My boss just looked over my shoulder and read what I’m typing. He didn’t say one word about changing my cynical tone. He just sighed and went into his office and shut his door. I think I can hear him crying in there.
If that part about the crying is in the final pamphlet that goes out, it must be because this threat is way worse than I’m letting on here and that this document, cynical and depressing as it is, is actually somehow better than leveling with you and telling the full story.
May God have mercy on our Internet-connected souls.
When a firm has a known point of ingress from the Internet, it will secure that connection. It will use firewalls, IPS devices, proxy servers, and also start getting IT help in the DC area so that they stay updated with changes. Those defenses will pass audits, no problem. But what about ways to get into the corporate network that aren’t known to central IT staff? What are the consequences of those unmanaged points of ingress?
We turn to Grover the Muppet for that lesson. In the video I linked, it is ostensibly about bringing a bowl of soup to a sick friend. However, on another level, it is teaching penetration testing techniques to five-year-olds.
Shalom Sesame: Mitzvah Impossible
Grover first encounters a wall. Call it a firewall, if you want. Rather than give up, Grover finds one way around it – going over. His friend finds another way – going around. In both cases, the wall did not cover all possible ingress paths, so it did not provide sufficient security. Later, when Grover encounters a cow blocking his path much like an IPS does, he need only pass a weak test – basically a declaration that his traffic is business critical – to continue forward with his payload.
Grover’s activity would be analogous to an attacker entering a network via an insecure ingress path and then using traffic defined as legitimate to continue with his operation. He uses methods so simple, a five-year-old could grasp them. Maybe those over five would do well to review the security video I linked to…
At any rate, the wall is very nice and blocks traffic that does not route around it. Had the wall been fitted over a cave mouth, it would have been much more difficult to route around, and that would be possible only if there was another unsecured path of entrance into the cave system. As it is, it needs to be taller and wider to cover those available paths of ingress.
How many firms have frustrated employees? I suspect it’s all of them. That’s bad news, because frustrated employees are also those that are most likely to call up a local ISP for a DSL line out of their local budget so that they can have Internet access for some purpose. Nobody higher up or in the central office approved the line: they just put it together themselves. And if central IT refused to allow that connection to hook up with the corporate network, that’s not a problem. They can buy some inexpensive small business switches and hubs and allow their PCs to connect to the corporate network and the shadow IT network at the same time.
How many firms have web developers on a tight schedule? Oh my, that’s a very high percentage… That’s bad news because those developers might set up VPN servers – only for emergency purposes, of course – so that they can connect from home to the test environment more effectively than they can if they use the corporate VPN. Or maybe they have a fileshare server opened up so it can offer its files on the Internet, making things much easier. Or maybe they use an insecure coding shortcut that gets the site up that much faster, even if it means it now allows quite a lot of malicious activity over HTTP and HTTPS.
How many firms have employees that click on links in emails? How many firms have contractors whose contracts have ended, but their workstations stayed logged in… and unpatched… and maintaining a dual-homed Internet connection on the guest network? How many firms have subsidiary or ancillary organizations that manage their own Internet connections… badly… and that have full trust relationships with the parent organization?
Well, that’s bad news, because… well, I’m sure you see the pattern here. None of these paths of ingress are properly managed, let alone secured. Malicious Grovers are carrying bowls of malware-infested chicken soup to servers and workstations that lap the stuff up without questioning.
So now the problem is finding the unmanaged ingress points. The solution is simple: look at your traffic. See if there is traffic on your network that has an outside IP as its source. Next, take a look to see what ports the traffic is using. If those ports are blocked on your firewalls, and I mean *all* your firewalls, see if there are routing paths to that outside IP that take odd twists and turns in your network. Perhaps they lead to that unauthorized ISP connection or that rogue VPN server.
Once you find those things and have them shut down, check your traffic again. You may very well see those IPs again on your network, now with new routes back out. Those will lead to other paths you want to close off.
You have to check constantly, because you will never know when someone creates a new path of ingress that endangers your network. You can also check for dual-homed devices and abandoned devices and try to police links in email messages. All those measures will help to keep five-year-old kids who saw the above video and got the wrong idea from hacking up your network.
Now, the disclaimer… I work for a vendor that not only makes a product that covers most of the detection methods and remediation items mentioned above, I’ve also used it in an environment that thought it had closed off all those other ways into its network. When I told them about the IP addresses in China that were scanning for the Cisco Smart Install port, they soon discovered that there yet remained more ways in that they would have to deal with.
This is not FUD. This is a realistic assessment of stuff that happens, most likely under everyone’s noses. Not everyone knows to look for this stuff, let alone knows how to look for this stuff, which is how it can go on and on. If auditors only know to check the managed gear, then a firm could conceivably pass audits and still have these issues happening.
So, take a tip from Grover and start looking for ways people break into your network that go over, around, or right on through your perimeter defenses.
I’ll put on my manager/owner hat, since I have one laying about the house, and will look at the receiving side of my constant cries to emphasize security spending. There, it’s on, although it seems to restrict blood flow to the part of my brain that handles technological details… never mind, let’s get to budgeting!
First off, security is very important. It’s so important, I’ll use a few more “verys” to emphasize that importance. It’s very very very very very important. But, before I can pay for security, I have to pay for a few other things.
Out of my revenue, first to go through are my loan payments. If I don’t keep current on my merchant loan companies and business loans, I close my doors. That’s a certainty. Ditto for payroll, rent, and utilities. I have to pay those, on time, every month, or I *will* close my doors.
Next up, I have to pay for my materials that I use in my business, whether those materials be solid manufacturing inputs or intangible information, it’s what I use to make my stuff. Without those inputs, my business is no more.
Then there’s advertising. I have to have that, right? I also need money for fees, which I pay to local, regional, and national government authorities in order to stay in business. If I don’t pay those, my business will certainly not be able to operate.
Now, I’ve got some money left over. Part of me wants to have a little more for myself, to compensate for all those days I lived out of my office, getting this business off the ground. That’s why I went into business, right, to make a little something for myself, over and above what The Man would pay me in a regular gig? I’ve got a business partner, as well, and we’ve been through everything together, all these years. I’ve got to give him his cut, fair’s fair.
What’s left is my IT budget. Before anyone panics, let me assure you that there’s still quite a lot of money in that pot.
But, before I pay for any security, I need to pay for my existing licenses. If my PCs don’t have an operating system, they don’t run, and I don’t have a business anymore. Then I pay for my productivity software because what’s the point of having PCs if they don’t do anything useful? No, I must have word processors, spreadsheets, and email! No compromise on that!
If I have specialized software for my line of business, you better believe there are some big-time license fees to run that stuff. But, without it, I can’t produce what my customers want. And neither can I fund for the CRM software that I brought after researching from https://www.salesforce.com/hub/crm/tips-for-crm-implementations/. Honestly, security is important to me, you saw how many “verys” I used up there, but I have to first allocate money for what’s core to my business.
But I’m almost to security in my line-items. Let me first cover printing costs, VoIP services, Internet connections, and a new box fan for my server closet. As long as we keep the fans on and the door open, the servers won’t overheat. That’s a good feeling to have, the feeling you get when you know the servers won’t overheat.
Now that I’m ready to buy some security, please don’t bring up the issue of locks on the doors. I can lock the outside doors, but if I lock the door to the server closet, we’re finished as a going concern.
Looking at the budget, there’s not a lot, so maybe I should get the most important piece of security gear and hope it does most of the work I need it to do. I’ll get a firewall and pay for that annual license/maintenance.
Then there’s an antivirus program that’s only $21.95 per workstation when I buy in bulk, I’ll get that. I don’t know if it’s any good, but it’s at least something.
I need to buy a backup and recovery solution, so that’s going to set me back a bit.
I also have to pay for spam filtering and DDoS protection through my ISP, or I get shut down by spammers and/or DDoSers. This expenditure, in fact, should have come before the backup and recovery.
When I ask the guy that comes in twice a week after lunch to do my IT about what else I should get, he’s got a long list of cool stuff. But when I look at the prices he quotes for them, I have to shake my head. I really can’t afford to spend thousands on a big piece of hardware like a proxy server or an IPS. Maybe if I saved up, I could, but I can’t spend that kind of money right now. And don’t even talk to me about IP protection or UEBA or other big systems like that, there’s no way I can buy one of those solutions.
The thing is, security is a matter of maybe I’ll lose my business if I don’t have it. The other things are a matter of I *WILL* lose my business if I don’t have them. Will beats maybe, every time. That good feeling I have about the servers not overheating is countered by the worry I have that one day, maybe tomorrow, I’m the next small business that gets hit with something that the firewall, antivirus, and/or antispam-antiDDoS can’t deal with. But that’s a maybe, a roll of the dice.
Eventually, I learn to live with “maybe” and I just focus on running my business, the best I can.
And if all my PCs, unbeknownst to me, are secretly mining bitcoins for North Korea or participating in Mafia-run botnets, it’s no concern to me as long as I keep in business. What I don’t know doesn’t impact my bottom line.
I’m not being callow or flippant about wanting to emphasize security but simply not having the budget for it. That’s a reality. And if I get to where the “maybe” doesn’t nag at me anymore, then I can live with myself and my decisions.
I just took off my manager/owner hat and read that over. It does make sense to me. As a security person, I see all the breaches and crashes and outbreaks. But I don’t see that, for most people, these are only rumors, things that happen to someone else. Daily bashing away at firewalls, constant spam and DDoS, legacy malware trying to infect your PC like it’s 1999, those are the constants that happen to everyone. Businesses must protect against them. The other stuff, though, that’s in the realm of “maybe” and that’s not a strong enough case to justify a major expenditure, particularly one that could cut deep into the profitability of a firm.