LONG STORY SHORT
By L. Dean Webb
KLAUS BARBIE AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
SECTION II: BARBIE'S RECRUITMENT AND USE BY THE U.S. ARMY, 1947 -1949
INTRODUCTION: THE UNITED STATES ARMY COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS
Following its defeat in May 1945, Germany was divided into four zones, occupied by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France. See Appendix 1. Within each zone, the occupying power was responsible for all military and civil affairs. In the U.S. zone, which included southern and eastern Germany to the Czech and Austrian borders, the military authority was the multi-service European Command (EUCOM). See Appendix 2.
Once of EUCOM's components was the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) Detachment, which had as its basic mission the protection of the U.S. Zone against espionage, sabotage and subversion. (Annual Narrative Report, 66th CIC Detachment, 31 Dec 49.) Thus, the 66th CIC's operations extended throughout the American Zone (including the American sector of Berlin) but did not extend into Austria or the zones of the other allies. EUCOM (headquartered in Heidelberg) exercised its supervision over the 66th CIC through its Intelligence Division, the director of which was brigadier general. See Appendix 3.
The 66th CIC (The Counter Intelligence Corps detachment in Germany was named the 970th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment when it was formed in November 1945; this designation was changed to the 7970th Counter Intelligence Corps Group in Hune 1948 and the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment in November 1949. For simplicity's sake the term "CIC" or "CIC HQ" will be used in this report to refer to this detachment and its headquarters, respectively.) was commanded by a colonel, and had a headquarters staff stationed in Frankfurt until September 1949, when it moved to Stuttgart. The CIC headquarters exercised its supervision over field operations primarily through a series of regions (see Appendix 4). Each region had a headquarters and several field offices in various cities or towns in its regions. In a conventional military sense, therefore, the chain of command in CIC ran from the commanding officer to the region commanders to the field offices.
In understanding the events of this report, however, it is necessary to focus on the operations personnel. At CIC Headquarters, the S-2/S-3 was the chief operations officer, responsible to the commanding officer for the conduct of intelligence activities. Under him, at headquarters, were the case officers, analysts, technical specialists and other personnel who dealt directly with the day-to-day business of intelligence gathering and analysis. In general terms, the headquarters S-3 staff received and analyzed information from the regions, set policies and procedures for intelligence operations, gave specific orders in specific cases to a region where needed, and exercised whatever supervision was necessary to see that the regions operated efficiently, effectively and in accordance with regulations and headquarters wishes. See Appendix 5.
Each region likewise has an S-2/S-3, who was responsible for the day-to-day intelligence operations within his region and who, like his counterpart at headquarters, saw to it that the operations within the region ran smoothly an in accordance with policies and regulations set by CIC headquarters. See Appendix 6.
Beginning in the summer of 1947, both CIC headquarters and the regions included "technical specialists" as part of the S-2/S-3 section. The function of the technical specialists was to keep track of informants (usually German citizens who provided information of intelligence interest to the CIC agents). Headquarters had four or five technical specialists at any given time, the regions each had one or two. One of the most important responsibilities of the technical specialists - or "tech specs" as they were commonly known - was to know who each informant was, to approve his use before he was "carded" (enrolled and paid) by the region, and to ensure that he was providing information to only one agent. Prior to the establishment of the technical specialist function, it was relatively easy for shrewd informants to create "paper mills" - providing the same information (which often was false) to several agents, none of whom knew about the others, creating the impression of independent sources, and thus, reliable information.
Because of their specialized functions, the operations personnel in the regions often communicated directly with operations personnel at headquarters. There was nothing intrinsically wrong about this, and indeed it was usually the most efficient means of exchanging information quickly and accurately. But it tended to leave the region commanders somewhat isolated from the routine activities of their regions - a fact that was corroborated by many of the witnesses (both region commanders and operations personnel) interviewed in this investigation.
There also appears to have been, among CIC personnel, a commonly recognized demarcation between the "intelligence pros" and the administrative officers. This distinction arose because most of the agents, regional operations officers and technical specialists (whether at headquarters or in the regions) were considered professional intelligence experts, while many (but by no means all) of the region commanders and headquarters staff were infantry, artillery or civil affairs officers serving a tour with CIC. The latter group tended to be less knowledgeable about intelligence gathering and to take less interest in it than the "intelligence pros."
There is some irony in this distinction because in the immediate post-war years, there were few experienced counter-intelligence officers at any level of the CIC - most of the "intelligence pros" had had no counter-intelligence experience during the war (few OSS officers joined CIC at war's end) and most took up their CIC careers after only a post-war training course at Ft. Holabird, Maryland.
In any event, many of the actions and decisions involving Klaus Barbie were taken by operations personnel at both CIC Headquarters and at the regions (particularly Region IV in Munich and, later, Region XII in Augsburg). This is not to suggest that commanding officers were intentionally bypassed or that they did not bear the responsibility for the actions of those under their command. The purpose of mentioning it here is simply to point out that, because of the factors mentioned above, decisions made at the operations level were not unusual in the day-to-day activities of the 66th CIC during this period.
A. Operation Selection Board
1. Barbie is Targeted for Arrest
Beginning in late 1945 or early 1946, a group of former SS officers still at large formed a clandestine "resistance" organization in occupied Germany. Rather than resorting to violence or terrorism, however, the leaders of this organization planned to approach occupation authorities with a proposal: to give to these men the responsibility of German administration in the British and American zones, thus ensuring a strong, experienced corps of post-war leaders, loyal to Germany and opposed to Communism. Tab 1.
CIC learned of this organization in May, 1946, and infiltrated a CIC agent, posing as a Swiss Nazi, to report on the organization's activities. Tab 1.
As more information came to CIC, it became apparent that one of the leading figures in this organization, a man based in Marburg who called himself "Becker," was in fact Klaus Barbie - a name that CIC Headquarters in Frankfurt could readily identify. On January 31, 1947, CIC HQ sent its Region III office, which covered the Marburg area, a copy of its "Central Personalities Index Card," which identified Barbie as "Leiter, Abt [eilung] IV, SD Kds Lyon" (Leader, Section IV, Sicherheitsdienst Kommando Lyon) - the head of the Gestapo in Lyon. Barbie was "last heard of in November and December 1944 in a hospital in Baden-Baden" Germany, near the French Border. (This information on Barbie apparently came from SHAEF, which had compiled brief descriptions, known as "SHAEF cards" on Nazi leaders during the war.) Tab 2.
Based on reports from its undercover agent, CIC assembled a profile of the organization, its several dozen members and three or four leaders. One of the leaders was thought to be Barbie, whose group was believed responsible for "the procurement of supplies for the organization and the establishment of an intelligence network throughout the British and American Zones." Tab 3. Specifically, members of Barbie's group were believed to be "people who have been connected in the past with one or more of the German Intelligence organizations, such as the Amts [Sections] III, VI and VII, RSHA." CIC believed that the "group led by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer [captain] Barbie has concentrated on the establishment of an intelligence network throughout the United States and British Zones, and possibly farther. [Barbie's] group takes care of the procurement of money, radio equipment, printing presses, etc. Centers of this group are in Marburg, Munich and Hamburg." Tab 4. (Independent corroboration of this information in 1983 is difficult; but whether the information is correct of not, these reports at least establish what CIC believed about Barbie in 1947.) Barbie himself was believed living at 35 Barfusserstrasse (or Barfuesslerstrasse) in Marburg, a city about 40 miles north of Frankfurt. (Barbie had been arrested by the Americans on August 28 or 30, 1946 in Marburg. He jumped out of the jeep taking him to be interrogated and made good his escape. Tab 5, 16, 28. Barbie apparently claimed at one point that he had been a CIC informant briefly in 1946 in the Marburg area, but this is unlikely. Tab 58.) Tab 4.
CIC, working closely with British military intelligence, decided early in February 1947 to stage a "swoop" to break up the organization, arrest its members, and interrogate them on their activities. Coining the name "Operation Selection Board," CIC HQ notified its regions on February 9, 1947 to execute the swoop at 2:00 a.m. on February 23. It provided a target list of some 57 members or suspected members of the SS organization, including Barbie, and their addresses. Tab 3.
As the day of the raid approached, some confusion arose over whether Barbie was actually at the address listed in Marburg. On February 17, CIC agents reported that there was no listing at the Marburg address for Barbie under his own name or his known aliases "Becker" or "Mertens," and that the "[t]arget is negative." Tab 5. (HQ had advised Region III in a supplemental memo on February 13 that Barbie was believed living at that address, perhaps uder the name of "Speer," Tab 5, but it is not clear whether Region III had checked under that name.) On February 20, CIC HQ directed Region III, perhaps in light of the report that Barbie was not at that address, that the Marburg address "will not be raided in order to protect a source of information" (emphasis in original) (This "source of information" was apparently the wife of a German who had died under somwhat uncertain circumstances while in British custody in Hamburg. Just why she was to be protected is not clear, except that the case was considered extremely sensitive at the time, and CIC did not wish to complicate matters.) But HQ added: "This does not imply any lack of interest in capturing any of the supposed inhabitants. Target 3, Claus [sic] Barbie, is especially desired." Tab 5.
In a memo on February 20, the Marburg office of Region III notified its agents of the names and addresses of the people to be arrested in the February 23 raids. "[the] purpose of [the] swoop operation," the memo said, "is to apprehend certain persons who have been known to have had connections in the past with one SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Barbie, Klaus." Tab 5. (Barbie himself was not listed as a target in this memo. This omission may simply reflect Region III's inability to confirm that he was in Marburg.
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Region III was ordered not to arrest Barbie. Such support as may exist for this theory is found in two cryptic documents in the Selection Board file. One is an undated teletyped conversation apparently between HQ and Region III, wherein an agent at HQ (Dreifuss) stated "We are stil not allowed to do anything overtly about target nr [number] three," who was Barbie. The other is a scrawled, unsigned note in the file that states, "The person to be left off is our No. 3 on [the target] list." Tab 6. There is no indication as to why Barbie would not be arrested, or who might have made such a decision. Indeed, as indicated in the text, CIC HQ was ordering Region III to arrest Barbie even though his apparent residence would not be raided to protect a source. And the "final report" from Region III on the swoop listed Target 3 simply as "not located." Tab 6. The significance of a decision not to arrest Barbie - if that is what indeed it was - is limited, however, for by April 16 Barbie was ordered arrested, as discussed in the text that follows.)
The swoop took place as planned in the early morning hours of February 23, and some 70 persons, including several people thought to have been in Barbie's group, were arrested and detained for interrogation, but Barbie himself was not found. (Barbie later stated that, on the night of the raid, he had been visiting a man named Becker in Kassel, 50 miles northest of Marburg. Becker was also a targer of Selection Board, and his home was raided by CIC. Barbie said he had slipped out of the house through the bathroom and escaped. Tab 9; Tab 29.) Region III reported to Headquarter that, as ordered, it had not raided the Marburg address, but it "strongly recommended" that the house there be "kept under surveillance so that the activities of Barbie, Klaus and associates which have not been apprehended be ascertained." Tab 7.
Despite the failure to capture Barbie in the Selection board swoop, CIC remained hopeful that Barbie would eventually be found. On March 8, some two weeks after the swoop, a memo to the CIC HQ Operations Officer from Capt. Robert Frazier, the case officer in charge of Operation Selection Board, noted that "Barbie (not yet arrested) still has a large number of contacts at large who are believed to be active in the procurement of flase papers, in sheltering of fugitives and in giving aid to politically active persons * * *." Tab 8.
2. Barbie Evades the Selection Board Dragnet
Barbie had in fact left Marburg a week or more before the Selection Bard raid, and had been meeting in Munich (some 220 miles southest or Marburg) with another memer of the underground organization, a former SS officer name Wenzel. Wenzel had brought into his confidence a German named Walter who, unbeknownst to Wenzel, was in fact an informant for Region I of the CIC in Stuttgart. (Walter was penetrating an "underground organization" under the Region I cryptonym of "Operation Flowerbox." It is not clear whether this organization is the same as that targeted in Operation Selection Board, although some of the Flowerbox targets, including Wenzel himself, were also targets of the Selection Board. While Flowerbox and Selection Board were separate CIC operations, it is conceivable that they were both targeting the same group, not knowing it was the same group.) Tab 9.
In the middle of February, Walter, Wenzel and Barbie had met, first in Munich and later near Stuttgart, and Barbie had confided to Walter (the covert CIC informant) that he, Barbie, had been in SS intelligence in Lyon and was wanted by the British. Tab 9.
By the time the Region I agent who was handling Walter learned of these mettings with Barbie, the February 23 Selection Board raid had already taken place. The CIC agent reported the events to the officer in charge of Region I on March 20, and recommended that "since Barbie is a high priority on the target list of Selection Board, his possible return to visit [Walter should ] be closely watched * * * so that he will be available for arrest if deemed necessary." Tab 9.
The same agent, however, also suggested that Barbie should perhaps not be arrested. Barbie "may well be a good source of information on personalities connected with Selection Board who have not yet been apprehended. * * * In addition, due to his background and experience with the GIS, ("German Intelligence Services," a blanket term sometimes used by Allied authorities.) it is very possible that Barbie might be useful in penetrating" a supposed Soviet intelligence net in a small town in the U.S. zone about which very little was known at that time. The agent continued: "It is recommended that Barbie not be interned as yet, but that he be used in an attempt to penetrate the supposed Soviet net. It is at present believed that a tight enough control over him can be maintained so that his arrest could easily be effected should such action become desirable. Using him for the purpose outlined here would be an excuse to keep him under surveillance." Tab 9.
The plan was not approved by CIC HQ, which ordered Region I to arrest Barbie "as quickly as feasible, bearing in mind the security of Region I informants," presumably meaning Walter. Tab 10 (Within a day or two or this order, however, Walter mentioned that "Barbie is presently working on an intelligence matter directed at" the presumed Soviet net mentioned above. So it is possible that Region I did employ Barbie pending HQ action. But that operation could not have lasted more than a few weeks, if indeed it did take place, because Barbie had left the Stuttgart area by mid-April. See text.)
That order came on April 16, 1947. By that time, however, Barbie, whether sensing danger or simply lucky, had left Walter, Wenzel and Sttuttgart behind and had made his way to Memmingen, a small city in CIC's Region IV, some 65 miles west of Munich. At least for the time being, he had eluded the Selection Board dragnet.
There were two further attempts to arrest Barbie as part of Operation Selection Board, both of them unsuccessful. The first attempt was made at the Barfusserstrasse address in Marburg by agents of Region III on April 17. Barbie was not there; he had almost certainly reached Memmingen, 200 miles to the south, on April 17. The Marburg address was kept upder surveillance, but to no avail. Tab 13
The second attempt came in May. Region I in Stuttgart reported that its informant Walter had set out from Stuttgart on May 1 for Kaufbeuren (Region IV) to track Barbie down and Region I notified Region IV to arrest Barbie if Walter located him. Tab 11. Unbeknownst to Region I, however, Region IV had already recruited Barbie by that time.
B. Recruitment and Use of Barbie by CIC: April-October, 1947
While Regions I and III pressed the search of Barbie in Stuttgart and Marburg, CIC agent Robert S. Taylor, stationed in the Memmingen office of CIC's Region IV, had located Barbie through a far different procedure. Since April 1946, one of agent Taylor's carded informants (paid sources) in Memmingen had been Kurt Merk, a former Abwehr (military intelligence) specialist who had served in Dijon, France during the war - "one of the best Counter Intelligence men in France during German occupation," according to Taylor. Tab 12. On April 10, 1947, Merk told Taylor he had "met, quite by accident, an old friend of his from France" by the name of Barbie, who had "excellent connections to sources of CIC information." Taylor recognized Barbie's name immediately as one of the "chief personalities" wanted in Operation Selection Board.
But Taylor did not notifiy Headquarters of his find. He checked with his superior, Lt. Col. Dale Garvey, Commanding Officer of Region IV, on April 14-15 and the decision was made (apparently by Taylor and Garvey) to use Barbie as an informant, provided that he "break off any connections he may have with illegal SS elements and Selection Board personalities." Tab 14.
Taylor met with Barbie in Memmingen on or about April 18, 1947 and the deal was agreed to. Barbie was willing to break off his former SS ties, because, as Taylor reported, "his connection with SS elements was necessary only to retain his own personal freedom." Tab 14. (Barbie also agreed to provide Taylor with any information he had concerning alleged attempts by the British to recruit former SS offficers as informants. Ibid.)
Barbie impressed Taylor at that time as "an honest man, both intellectually and personally, absolutely without nerves or fear. He is strongly anti-Communist and a Nazi idealist who believes that he and his beliefs were betrayed by the Nazis in power." Tab 14.
In April and May, 1947, while Region III continued to look for him in Marburg, Agent Taylor of Region IV used Barbie as a carded source in Memmingen. Barbie reported on French intelligence operations in the U.S. Zone of Germany, on activities of Romanian ethnic Germans, and on Soviet (and anti-Soviet) activities in the U.S. Zone.
This use of Barbie was apparently not known to CIC Headquarters until two months after it began. On May 22, 1947, Captain Frazier at CIC HQ, after reading a routine intelligence report on Region IV, asked for clarification of certain matters. (The area on which he sought clarification could not be determined. See Tab 14.) Taylor for the first time reported to CIC HQ that the source of that information was not Merk, as Taylor had originally reported, but Klaus Barbie.
Taylor acknowledged in his report that Barbie was to be arrested in Operation Seletion Board, but Taylor requested that Barbie "be allowed to retain his freedom as long as he works for this Agent." Taylor explained (Tab 14) :
It is felt that his value as an informant infinitely outweighs any use he may have in prison. Control over Barbie's activities is obvious. It is felt that Barbie wil answer more fully and freely any questions concerning SS groups or Seletion Board groups desired by higher headquarters, if he is allowed to retain his freedom. This opinion is based on this Agent's personal contact with Barbie and the trust that Barbie has placed in this Agent.
Region IV forwarded Taylor's report and request to CIC HQ on June 3, 1947, recommending that Barbie be used as Taylor suggested. "It is emphasized," that the Region IV operations offiecer to CIC HQ, "that Subject's value as an informatn cannot be overlooked." Tab 14.
CIC Headquarters did not respond to this request. Despite the fact that Barbie was then being sought by two other CIC regions in the mopping up of Selection Board, the request was simply ignored. See Tab 57 para5.
In the face of Headquarters silence, Taylor placed increasing reliance on both Merk and Barbie in the months that followed. By the summer of 1947, Merk had developed a net of 48 to 52 informants throughout Germany and, indeed, much of Eastern Europe. Tab 24. In this net, code named "Buro Petersen," Barbie was Merk's chief assistand, taking on, as Region IV reported to HQ several months later, "the important position of establishing a long range penetration of French intelligence installations is the Frence Zone," which by the fall of 1947 was "beginning to show consistently excellent results." Tab 17. CIC Agent Camille Hajdu, who replaced Taylor in the summer of 1947 as the handler of Merk's net, found the net far too large and gradually pared it down from 50 to about 14-16 informants, all within the U.S. Zone of Germany. Tabs 24, 25. Nonetheless, Hajdu reported, Barbie "has so far demonstrated exceedingly successful results." Tab 17. Indeed, Region IV was highly dependent on Merk and Barbie and the sub-sources. Their information amounted to as much as 90% of the intelligence received by Hajdu's office in Kaufbeuren. Tabs 24, 58.
C. Arrest and Interrogation of Barbie: October 1947-May 1948
1. Arrest
On October 17, 1947, however, Hajdu's superior, Lt. Col. Garvey, Commanding Officer of Region VI, in a memorandum to CIC HQ, noted that Barbie had been listed as a target of Operation Selection Board back in February, and Garvey notified CIC Headquarters that Barbie's present whereabouts were known. He requested instructions as to "what dispostion should be made" of Barbie. Tab 15. Twelve days later, on October 29, 1947, Major Earl Browning, S-3 (Operations Officer) at CIC Headquarters, directed Region IV to arrest Barbie and send him to the European Command Intelligence Center (ECIC) at Overursel, near Frankfurt, for "detailed interrogation." Tab 15. (This order, signed by Major Browning, was apparently instigated by Technical Specialist Joseph Vidal, who was by then conducting a thotough review of CIC's informants. Tab 57.
The European Command Intelligence Center [ECIC] was a large detention camp where security suspects, prisoners of war and defectors were held and interrogated.)
At the same time, Browning sent interrogation instructions to ECIC describing Barbie's alleged activities in the 1946-47 period, including his travels in Germany, his contacts with various Germans and his alleged involvement in a jewel theft and the black market. Tab 16. Aside from requesting that ECIC "complete [Barbie's] history," however, CIC Headquarters did not appear interested in Barbie's warime activities or, indeed, anything other than what Barbie might know of former SS officers and other suspected subversives still at large.
It is not entirely clear why Garvey notified CIC Headquarters of his valuable source in October, after having utilized him for six months, or why CIC Headquarters, after having ignored the original June 3 report on Barbie, now ordered him detained for questioning. One explanation may be that in the spring of 1947, CIC Headquarters had expanded its section of technical specialists and had given them responsiblity for keeping track of informants. Tab 57. It is possible that this newly upgraded section, in reviewing the files, discovered Region IV's June 3 message and had asked Region IV (orally or by a letter not in the file) to report on Barbie's present status. See Tab 57, para5.
In any event, CIC HQ's directive to send Barbie to ECIC for questioning was not well received by Region IV. On November 21, 1947, Agent Hajdu noted that Barbie had "extensive connections with high level former German intelligence circles" and had been "exploiting these contacts" to furnish CIC with "extreamly good material." Hajdu noted Barbie's role on "French intelligence activities in the French and U.S. zones" and cautioned that, in the light of Barbie's "exceedingly successful" work for CIC in the seven months since his recruitment, his arrest "would damage considerably the trust and faith which informants place in this organization." (In contrast to the highly favorable reports on Barbie quoted above, a report compiled in May 1950 by Capt. Eugene Kolb, then the operations officer of the Region, noted "[M]uch of the information supplied by this [Merk] net was highly imaginative, if not completely false * * *." Tab 58. But, acccording to a 1949 report by Kolb, Barbie himself had cautioned CIC against placing too much reliance on this suspect information. Tab 38)
Hajdu stongly recommened that Barbie not be arrested and that any interrogation on his pre-recruitment activities "be conducted on a voluntary basis," without incarceration, and preferably by the local CIC agents in Region IV, not by ECIC agents in Ovebursel. Hajdu contended that if this were done, Barbie
will voluntarily submit to any interrogation and [Barbie's] services to this organization will not be lost. Furthermore the prestige which this organization enjoys with its informants will remain undamaged. [Tab 17]
The commanding officer of Region IV, Lt. Col. Ellington Golden (who had replaced Lt. Col. Garvey) passed this report up to CIC HQ on November 25, 1947, noting that he "strongly concur[red]" with Agent Hajdu's comments. Golden then suggested that if Barbie must be arrested, he at least receive "some type of preferential treatment" during his interrogation and be "permitted to return to his work in this Region" after his interrogation was completed. "[A]ny treatment other than that outlined above would result in material damage to the information net," Golden warned HQ. Tab 17.
The plea from Hajdu and Golden raised some eyebrows at CIC HQ, not so much because of the request for voluntary interrogation or preferential treatment, but because of the scope of Region IV's actions in running the Merk-Barbie net. "What authority does Region IV have," asked Technical Specialist Joseph Vidal of a colleague at HQ, "for operating a net that extends into the French Zone." Of occupied Germany? Tab 17.
Major Browning, the Operations Officer at CIC HQ and Vidal's superior, responded to Region IV on December 1. Browning implicitly rejected the Region's requests for special treatment and ordered that Barbie be "immediately transferred" to the ECIC in accordance with his original directive of October 29. In an apparent effort to assuage the Region's concerns, however, Major Browning noted that Barbie's "subversive activity" was "not of the nature to demand his imprisonment" and that he was to be interrogated about his knowledge of the activities of other ex-Nazis. Major Browning promised that Barbie would be returned to Region IV "providing the interrogation provides no information which would demand [Barbie's] imprisonment * * *."
Browning also called the Region's attention to the penetration of French activities in the French Zone, and stated that such was in "contravention" of Headquarters directives. Browning asked the Region to provide, within four weeks, further information on the Merk-Barbie net, including where and by what authority it operated and what information had it produced. Tab 17.
Region IV duly placed Barbie under arrest on December 11 for transfer to ECIC and interrogation there. Tab 18.
(That same day, Lt. Col. Golden reported back, apparently somewhat nervously, on the questions HQ had raised on Region IV's activities against French intelligence. "[I]t is not the desire of thes headquarters," said Lt. Col. Golden, "to violate in any manner whatsoever the sprit or interest" of HQ directives. The previous report on French Zone activites was "somewhat vague," and "in order to clarify any misunderstanding," Golden explained the situation.
The key to the net, said Golden, was Merk, a man with "excellent connections to former German intelligence personnel" and who had recruited a net of six main sub-informants, including Barbie. Merk had also been in contact with three "old intelligence acquaintances" who lived in the French Zone and who "have worked their way into intelligence positions in the French Zone." These men, Golden said, "have access to classifed information of counterintelligence interest" and had visited Merk and Barbie (in the U.S. Zone to pass on this information in return for cigarettes or food.
As to the possible violation of CIC directives on operations outside of the U.S. Zone, Golden emphasized that Merk and Barbie "merely accepted" the information passed on from the informants in the French Zone; the informants were not being directed by Merk or Barbie. Thus, said Golden, Merk and Barbie were simply "accepting," in the U.S. Zone, certain "information which affect US interests in the US Zone * * *." Tab 18.
This carefully worded report did not give a full picture of Region IV's operations in the French Zone. A report from the operations officer of Region IV in March 1948 stated that Merk's net "was not concentrating within the American Zone" until Agent Hajdu took it over from Taylor in 1947 and cut it down to size. Tab 25.)
In reviewing the events surrounding Barbie's arrest by CIC in 1947, certain facts are apparent. First, although CIC's "Central Presonalities Index" card had identified Barbie was head of the Gestapo in Lyon, there was no evident concern over Barbie's Gestapo background or any of his wartime activities. Nothing in Browning's arrest order or his detailed interrogation instructions to ECIC showed any interest in any Gestapo connection; indeed, there was no reference to it. CIC Headquarters' interest in Barbie, at least at the time of his arrest, focused almost exclusively on his knowledge of activities involving the post-war activities of ex-SS officers.
Second, it appears to have been Headquarters' intent that Barbie's interrogation at ECIC in Region IV. Browning's concern was in gaining information not about Barbie himself, but about Barbie's former associates in the SS network. Thus, Browning could assure Region IV that, when the interrogation at ECIC was finished, Barbie "will be returned to [Region IV's] custody with instructions for future dispostion," provided that Barbie did not incriminate himself with "information which would demand his imprisonment."
Finally, despite the fact that Barbie was identified on CIC's own "Central Presonalites Index" as the leader of the Gestapo in Lyon, and despite the fact that he was listed in the CROWCASS register as wanted for murder in France, (The original CROWCASS list of July 1945, which had listed Barbie as wanted by the French for murder of civilians and torture of military personnel (see Section I.H, above) had been susperseded by a new CROWCASS list in March 1947, just prior to Barbie's recruitment. This new list (Tab 19) contained the name of "Klaus Barbie" as wanted by France for "murder." The new list, wich directed that "all previous CROWCASS wanted lists should be destroyed," eliminated any reference to torture and did not specify "civilians" as the victims. Furthermore, the CROWCASS list noted, "The information in this list about each person is all that is contained in the Wanted Reports filed with CROWCASS. The discriptions given are not summaries." (Emphasis in original.) For a discussion of the significance of this list in appraising CIC's action during this period, see Section VI.B, below.) both Region IB and CIC HQ seemed to treat him simply as a former intelligence officer. Lt. Col. Golden's report, quoted above, to CIC Headquarters at the time of Barbie's arrest and transfer to ECIC in December 1947 (Tab 18) identified Barbie as a "[t]rained intelligence officer" who had worked with Merk "in [an] intelligence capacity in France." More significantly, Golden reported that Barbie had been a Hauptsturmfuehrer (SS captain) in "Amt VI) the SD (intelligence), rather than Amt VI, the Gestapo. Although someone, perhaps a technical specialist at HQ, circled "VI" on Golden's report and wrote "IV??," suggesting Barbie's Gestapo connection, nothing came of it.
Thus, Barbie's background as an SS and Gestapo officer appears to have been distinctly subordinate to Region IV's interest in using him as an informant and HQ's interest in extracting from him information about other SS officers involved in post-war "subversive activities."
This apparent disinterest in Barbie's Gestapo background apparently reflected the attitude in CIC that, by 1947, former Gestapo agents were no longer considered the "security threat" that had made them targets for arrest immediately after the war. By the time of Barbie's transfer to ECIC in December 1947, the Allied authorities had thoroughly obliterated any remnants of the Nazi regime.
With the passage of time and the assertion of Allied control had come a change in policy in CIC's treatment of former Gestapo members. Although the policy was never formally articulated, interviews of former CIC personnel and review of CIC files suggest the following situation. During the year immediately after the end of the war, Gestapo personnel were arrested as security risks. In the internment camps, however, former members of the Gestapo and Abwehr (military intelligence) were used as informants to double-check information that their fellow arrestees were providing about themselves to U.S. authorities. Such Gestapo informants who were themselves found not to have taken part in war crimes were released from internment and were occassionally used as CIC informants.
As increasing numbers of former Gestapo camp informants were released in 1946-1947, their use apparently grew, although to what extent is uncertain. A directive issued in June 1949, apparently the only written guidance on the subject of use of former Gestapo personnel, acknowledged that there was "a certain amount of confusion" in the field on this subject and noted, "It should * * * be very firmly stated that the US authorities have not relaxed for one minute their moral rejection of War Criminals." It continued:
It was the policy of this Headquarters to discourage the use of Gestapo personnel as further sources of this organiztaion except in unusual circumstances. It may be necessary to use the Gestapo man for the following short term tasks:
1. To introduce the [CIC] Agent to other Gestapo personnel
2. To effect a meeting with former sources [of the Gestapo man]
3. To control an ex-source in the relationship if the relationship is extremely well founded and it is practically impossible for the agent to take over control of the source.
There is no objection to the use of the Gestapo man for purpose of 1 and 2 above provided the amount of time involved is short. A major project involving a long period of time * * * is to be discouraged. All request for the use of Gestapo personnel to accomplish 3 above will be cleared and approved by this Headquarters. An extremely strong case must be presented and your report must show complete use of your existing facilities and techniques before the request will be approved.
Tab 20.
As the following sections show, this policy which was announced two years after Barbie was recruited was obviously not applied to Barbie, since his use was not "short term" nor did it require reliance on his former sources.
2. Interrogation
When Barbie arrived at ECIC in mid-December, 1947, he was interrogated only on his 1945-1946 contacts with suspected subversives. In fact, about a week after his arrival, CIC HQ specifically requested ECIC that it not interrogate Barbie "concerning his employment by this [CIC] detachment." Tab 21. Nor had CIC provided ECIC with information on Barbie's activities for CIC.
As instructed, ECIC interrogated Barbie about his post-war contacts with former SS personnel; Barbie told them he had rejected overtures by a former SS officer named "Winter" who tried to enlist Barbie in 1946 to sell military intelligence to both the Americans and the Soviets. The ECIC interrogators concluded that Barbie was credible and that he did not appear to be affiliated with "Winter's" double-dealing network. (It is not clear from these materials whether "Winter" ever actually formed such a net.) Tab 22. As to his wartime activities, ECIC noted briefly - and incorrectly - that Barbie had been a captain in the Waffen SS (the military arm of the SS). ECIC also noted - correctly - that Barbie had been a "member" of the SD. This information apparently came from Barbie himself. ECIC did not pursue the matter of SS affiliations, however.
Although this interrogation was completed by January 28, 1948, Barbie was kept in custody at ECIC. Joseph Vidal, the technical specialist at CIC Headquarters, was apparently growing increasingly concerned over the operation of the Merk-Barbie net. On March 18, 1498, Vidal reversed the earlier instruction and told ECIC to interrogate Barbie about his recruitment, assignments and reporting responsibilities as a CIC informant, and whether "after he is released," he wished to "continue work for CIC." "An inducement to make subject talk," said Vidal, "can be given him by informing him that his release depends on completeness of his answers to the above questions," Vidal also advised ECIC to suggest, but not actually dictate, that Barbie not contact British intelligence. (CIC believed that Barbie had been approached by British intelligence in 1946 to work for them and that he considered doing so. Tab 57.) Tab 26.
Again, ECIC interrogated Barbie. Tab 27. For the first time, Barbie gave ECIC a detailed summary of his career. He joined the SD in 1935, he said, and from 1937 to 1945 spent his entire time with Section VI, the foreign intelligence branch. He became an officer in 1939 and served in Brussels, Paris, Italy, and "SE France." There was no mention of Section IV of the Gestapo.
Barbie told ECIC that in 1946 he had been approached by a man named Emil Hoffman, who told Barbie that he was a former member of the German Diplomatic Corps then working for the British. According to Barbie, Hoffman attempted to enlist Barbie in early 1947 as a sub-informant but Barbie, who had been arrested briefly by the British in November 1946 and escaped, thought the British might still be after him. He declined Hoffman's offer, and Hoffman eventually went away. (Barbie stated that he had been arrested by the British after he was betrayed by a German who knew his whereabouts. He was jailed briefly in a house in Hamburg used by British intelligence but escaped after two days by sneaking past a guard. Tab 28. Barbie also provided ECIC with information on Germans whom Barbie believed were working for the British. Tab 28. Just why ECIC went into these matters in such detail is not clear; the most likely hypothesis is that CIC was interested in Germans, particularly former SS officers, who might have been British informants.) Tab 27.
Barbie told ECIC that he had been looking for an opportunity to work for the Allies against the Soviets when he heard that his "good friend" Merk was working for the Americans. Barbie detailed how he had contacted Merk, who had put him in touch with agent Taylor in Memmingen.
Merk's net, said Barbie, was responsible for information on Soviet intelligence in both the Soviet and U.S. Zones of Germany and its ties with French intelligence, including identification of Soviet agents in those areas. In addition, Merk and Barbie were to attempt to penetrate Soviet intelligence by doubling its agents, and to source Soviet military intelligence. (Verification of the scope of Barbie's operations is difficult in 1983 because the reports filed by him, Merk and the other informants could not be located and may have been destroyed long ago, perhaps shortly after they were submitted and analyzed. The most reliable present day guide to his operations are the contemporaneous accounts of CIC's agents handling Barbie and the Merk net, which are quoted in this report. The possibility that even these accounts may be somewhat inflated cannot be overlooked, however, since they were primarily written to justify continued employment of the net.) Tab 29.
According to Barbie, the members of the net reported to Merk or Barbie, who evaluated their information and passed it on to CIC agents Taylor and, later, Hajdu. (Barbie knew Hajdu as "Stevens," a variant of Hajdu's cover name "Stevenson.") The net had a payroll of about 7,000 to 15,000 Reichsmarks (RM) monthly, approximately $700-1500, which was paid to Merk for distribution to the other members of the net, as well as cigrettes and food. Barbie himself received RM 500 ($50), he said. Tab 29
The ECIC officer who had interviewed Barbie noted, "Barbie is ready to return to Memmingen to continue with his work. He prefers to do so if at all possible, but he is also willing to transfer to another location or to any other department of CIC." Tab 29. The agent observed:
Although Barbie claims to be anti-Communist, it is felt that the main reason for his great efforts and endeavors to work for the Western Allies is based on a desire to obtain his personal freedom. Barbie falls under the automatic arrest category, and his present employment [with CIC] offers him personal freedom, the liberty to be with his family, a decent wage, an apartment, and security.
Tab 27.
ECIC concluded: "Because of Barbie's activities with CIC Region IV during 1947, it is not deemed advisable to intern him for his affiliation with the Waffen SS. His knowledge as to the mission of CIC, its agents, subagents, funds, etc. is too great." If interned, ECIC concluded, Barbie might escape and turn to French or British intelligence with his extensive knowledge of CIC operations. Tab 29
What Barbie had told ECIC about his wartime service was not fully correct - he omitted any reference to the Gestapo and concocted an affiliation with the Waffen SS, the military branch - but ECIC took Barbie's representations at face value. (ECIC had available to it the SHAEF cards, which referred to Barbie's affiliation with the Gestapo in France. Why ECIC interrogators did not pursue this point is not at all clear.) Furthermore, even by the spring of 1948 when ECIC concluded its interrogation, it was clear that Barbie's eight months of services to Region IV from April to December, 1947 had placed him in an unusually advantageous position. His knowledge of CIC operations and personnel was "too great" to justify any internment.
On May 10, 1948, its task complete, ECIC noted that Barbie was "[o]f no further CI [counterintelligence] interest" and returned him to CIC, Tab 29.
D. Barbie's Renewed Use: 1948-1949
1. Reconstruction of the Merk Net
While Barbie was being held at ECIC from December 1947 to May 1948, Merk's bet had been undergoing some turmoil. In February 1948, CIC Headquarters had learned from EUCOM that the French wanted Merk for "war crimes" allegedly committed in Stuttgart. (The French charge was not in the files located. It is not clear if the French knew that Merk was working for CIC or if they ever made any request of American authorities for his surrender.) Agent Hajdu interviewed Merk, who denied ever having been in Stuttgart. Tab 23. But that was not the only problem. Hajdu, who had taken over the net from Taylor in 1947, had by the spring of 1948 pared down its size from 50 to 16 and had restricted its activities to the U.S. Zone. Merk, who had been close to Taylor, was unhappy with the new arrangement, Hajdu for his part was growing frustrated with what he saw as Merk's deteriorating performance. Hajdu proposed that Merk be fired and his informants split up into three smaller nets. Tab 24.
Hajdu's superiors in Region IV were likewise unhappy with Merk's performance. Capt. Max Etkin, the Region's operations officer, told CIC Headquarters on March 8, 1948 that, until Hajdu had taken over in fall of 1947, the net had operated beyond the American Zone. And Merk had apparently sent one of the net members on a mission to Berlin, without Hajdu's knowledge, much to the irritation of CIC's Berlin office. Etkin told CIC Headquarters that some of Merk's sub-informants should be retained, but that Merk himself should be discharged. Etkin raised the possibility that Merk could be turned over to the French, but he suspected that the French wanted to use Merk themselves, not try him as a "war criminal." Speaking for Region IV, Etkin was not enthusiastic about releasing such a valuable asset to the French; he suggested Merk might be a good candidate for the CIA instead. (The CIA in Europe used the cover name of "Department of the Army Detachment" (DAD). Etkin refers to the "War Department Detachment" but apparently meant DAD.) Tab 25.
CIC Headquarters took no immediate action on these proposals from Region IV, but on May 28, shortly after Barbie was released from ECIC, Major Browning, the operations officer at CIC Headquarters, directed Region IV to submit a "plan for approval by this headquarters" describing how Merk and Barbie would be used in the future, including the scope of their activity, their targets, the CIC agents to whom they would be responsible, the salaries to be paid, and so forth. Tab 30. Browning noted that Headquarters approval would be required for "any future employment of [Barbie and Merk] and their net." This caution was apparently based not on Barbie's background or on anything ECIC had reported, but on Headquarters' concerns - and perhaps the region's concerns - over the size and scope of the Merk net. (Indeed, Browning issued this directive before CIC HQ had received ECIC's final report on Barbie, which did not come until June 6, some two weeks later. Tab 29.)
Given both Agent Hajdu's and region operations officer Etkin's prounounced misgivings about Merk, it is somewhat curious that Browning at CIC Headquarters asked for a detailed plan for use of Merk and Barbie and made clear that "future employment" would depend on a satisfactory answer. But as HQ technical specialist Vidal recalled in 1950:
[W]hen Barbie was released from ECIC in early 1948, it was deemed advisable to continue using him as an informant in Region IV because of his detailed knowledge of CIC modus operandi and because of the apprehension of [CIC] headquarters that Barbie, if not employed, would continue his overtures to the British to work for them as an informant. If Barbie had been allowed to make these overtures the British would have found out that the reason CIC had not turned Barbie in or reported him in connection with Selection Board was based on the fact that he was employed by CIC as an informant. At that time the revelation of [Barbie's] connection to CIC as an informant would have been a serious blow to CIC's prestige in the eyes of the British. His continued employment then with CIC was based on his utility and the desire of CIC to obviate an embarrassing situation. Tab 57.
Region IV's response, perhaps with HQ's knowledge, was to reorganize the Merk net first and submit a request for approval afterwards. In June and July 1948, the net was moved to Augsburg, operating from a municipal swimming pool building where Americans and Germans could come and go without arousing suspicion. Agent Hajdu, who had reduced and restricted the net, had been reassigned, and the operation now came under the "overall direction" of technical specialist Richard K. Lavoie at Region IV's office in Munich and the "specific direction" of CIC agent Erhard Dabringhaus, who took over the net in Augsburg on June 15, 948. Tabs 31, 32.
Dadringhaus was mindful of "the French situation in which [Merk] is involed" - apparently a reference to the fact that Merk was being sought by the French - but concluded, "[Merk] can be easily controlled by offering him protection of the US Army." Tab 31.
But if Lavoie and Dabringhaus were aware of the earlier uneasiness at HQ over operations in the French Zone, they apparently did not share it. According to their plan, Barbie was to be used for "penetration of illegal Soviet organizations in the US Zone and for overall direction of French activities," including "French intelligence activities in the French Zone and had "a very close connection" with French intelligence, which they reportedly penetrated on behalf of CIC. Tab 57.
Dabringhaus reported to Lavoie that Merk would submit the names and addresses of the other net members "as soon as the undersigned has agreed to keep them under [Merk's] direction." Tab 31. Dabringhaus apparently complied, and Merk gave him the names. Tab 32.
Lavoie estimated the "overall [monthly] operational cost of the network" as "approximately equivalent in supplies to 3,500 DM," then about $900. The "supplies" were customarily cigarettes, coffee, and food that were given to informants in addition to small amounts of currency. Dabringhaus reported that Merk wanted DM 8,000 to 10,000 ($2,000 to $2,500) to operate his net "efficiently." Dabringhaus gave him DM 500 ($125). Tab 31.
On August 23, 1948, Lavoie, responding to Browning's May 28 memo, requested approval of the reorganized net, noting that it "has proven to be one of the most fruitful sources of information for Region IV," an "exceptionally well qualified intelligence net whose missions and targets can be changed at a moment's notice." Tab 32.
While Lavoie awaited a response from Headquarters, the net went into - or continued - operation. In the five-week period from August 26 to October 1, 1948, when he was transferred, Agent Dabringhaus paid Merk DM 800 ($200), 80 packages of cigarettes, and 6 ration cards. On October 1, the Merk net was given to Agent Herbert Bechtold. Tab 31.
2. Dissolution of the Merk Net
CIC HQ was cool to Lavoie's plan, however; Major Browning told Region IV on October 25, 1948 that "[a]fter due consideration by all concerned at this headquarters," it was the "consensus" that Merk's net "should be dropped as such by this organization." Tab 33. Browning cited a variety of administrative problems in maintaining the net - its huge size in the past with the likelihood that those since dropped might be working for foreign intelligence and still in touch with the remaining 12 members; the difficulty of direct control of sub-sources; interference with other CIC regions; the financial burden; and so forth. Browning also observed that "to continue employing subject net, we must protect an individual who is wanted by an Allied country for war crimes" - an apparent reference to Merk. Browning suggested that the Department of the Army Detachment - a pseudonym for the Central Intelligence Agency - "should be contacted for possible employment of subject net by [that] agency."
Headquarters agreed that individual net members could be retained as informants if they worked individually, had "specific potentialities" and had backgrounds that would not cause "undue embarrassment" to CIC. Tab 33. But Browning's memo was not quite an order; he solicited Region IV's comments on the "proposals" to disband the Merk-Barbie net.
Region IV did not like the idea. On November 16, 1948 - by which time the net had been operation for three to four months - Capt. Etkin, the region's operations officer, responded, pointing out that the net was being reduced again, to six persons, and was thus both secure and administratively workable. But the six remaining (including Merk and Barbie) insisted on working together, not individually. Moreover, warned Etkin, "[t]he three (3) key personnel of the net [Merk, Barbie, and a third man (The third man, who operated in the French Zone, was later dropped because his information was too expensive and too hard to verify. Tab 36.)] will discontinue to trust or maintain contact with their former colleagues [apparently a reference to the dropped informants] because of fear of being left out in the cold, and they are firmly convinced that the U.S. authorities are going to help them in the event of trouble as they have in the past." (No indication was given as to what this "trouble" might be, but it may have been a reference to the fact that both Merk and Barbie were not eager to be turned over to French authorities.) Tab 33.
An informal repost compiled by a Region IV agent in preparation for Etkin's reply to HQ stated "Merk and Barbie have both agreed and are currently working on a local basis by turning former Gestapo and SS informants known to them in former times." But the agent noted: "Barbie is concerned about the French and realize [sic] that if the French were ever to get control of him he would be executed." Tab 33.
CIC HQ and Region IV worked out a compromise, approved by Browning: a 3-month extension of the net, following which the matter of its "continued employment" would be decided. Tab 33. Merk and Barbie spent that time "seeking out as many old Gestapo and SS informants as possible, and especially those whose mission was KPD [German Communist Party] penetration under the Nazi regime." Tab 36.
On February 19, 1949, three months later, the officer in charge of Region IV's Augsburg office reported to Region IV that Merk and Barbie had "slowly but satisfactorily" progressed in this endeavor, penetrating KPD activities in Augsburg and gathering "not * * * sensational, but very informative" intelligence. Region IV passed the report to CIC Headquarters, stating that the net "if properly directed, is and can be a valuable source of [counterintelligence] information * * *." Tab 36.
But on April 1, 1949, some nine months after the net began in Augsburg, and nearly six months after CIC HQ's tentative disapproval, Headquarters formally notified Region IV that the request for a further extension of the net itself was disapproved, without further explanation. As to the individuals themselves, Browning ordered that Merk be "dropped" but that Barbie remain employed "primarily for the purpose of recruiting informants." Other informants would either be dropped of employed individually. Tab 36.
This marked the end of Merk's active service to CIC, (Quite apart from HQ's decision, Merk was apparently getting restless in Augsburg. He had some medical problems, he felt constrained by the reduced scope of his net, and tension with Barbie was growing. Merk was inactive during the summer of 1949 because of his medical problems, and he was severed from the CIC in October 1949. he died in Germany in 1951. Tab 37.) and it marked the end of a network of informants that at its peak had extended throughout Germany and much of Eastern Europe, at least as far as any American could figure it out. But it was not - nor was it intended to be - the end of Barbie's services as a full time employee of the Army. He stayed in Augsburg with his family - his wife, a daughter born just after the war started and a son born just after it ended - and concentrated on gathering information on Communist party activities for Region IV. Tabs 37, 58. (In late December 1948 or early January 1949, Lavoie became aware that British intelligence was looking for information on Barbie, because they were concerned that Barbie might be organizing an effort to "eliminate" Germans who spied for the British. Lavoie knew of Barbie's hatred for the British because of his alleged mistreatment in 1946, but Lavoie had satisfied himself that Barbie was not actually trying to eliminate British informants. He passed his information to Vidal, asking what, if anything, he should tell the British about Barbie. Vidal decided that, since British intelligence had not asked CIC directly for information on Barbie, there would be no reply "until [we are] asked specifically." Tab 35.)
E. Interrogation of Barbie by French Intelligence
Meanwhile, in 1948, the French had entered the picture. In Paris, the French government was preparing a treason prosecution against Rene Hardy, a French resistance leader who had allegedly betrayed his organization to Barbie and the Gestapo.
On May 14 and 18, 1948 - a few days after Barbie was released from ECIC - he was interrogated in Frankfurt by representatives of the Surete; a third interrogation was held on July 16 in Munich. These sessions were undoubtedly arranged through U.S. military authorities, although there is no reference in any U.S. materials to them. (Information on these interrogations comes from the archives of the French Ministry of Justice, reviewed in this investigation.) The transcription of these interrogations make clear that the French officials questioned Barbie only on the matter of his actions involving the French resistance and did not raise the question of Barbie's own involvement in alleged war crimes.
Later in 1948, the French returned. Lt. John Whiteway, a Canadian citizen serving as the French liaison to EUCOM, approached CIC and the Intelligence Division (ID) of EUCOM, and stated that the French government might serve a summons on Barbie to appear in Paris as a witness in the Hardy trial. Shortly thereafter, CIC received from the French (precisely from whom is uncertain) a "verbal "request" for Barbie.
But CIC was most reluctant to release Barbie to the French. Vidal, who represented CIC in the negotiations with Whiteway, reported his concern that Barbie would have been interrogated "in the usual French manner and forced to not only reveal information pertaining to the Hardy case but also to reveal information pertaining to his activities [with] CIC and his connections in the French Zone" - the "connections" being Barbie's penetration, through his sources, of French intelligence activities in the French U.S. zones.
So Whiteway and Vidal struck a deal. Barbie would not go to Paris; French officials would come into the U.S. Zone and take Barbie's testimony there. On January 21, 1949, French officers interrogated Barbie in Munich in the presence of U.S officers, about the Hardy case - and nothing else. Tabs 57, 34. they returned twice more in early 1949 for further questioning of Barbie. According to Vidal, the French representatives procured "sufficient information to satisfy their needs." (During this time, CIC was also concerned and annoyed by the quite separate efforts of the Surete, the French national police, who were sending "various and sundry individuals" into the U.S. Zone to seek information, from German police and CIC agents in the field, on that the Surete at that time had been "thoroughly penetrated by communist elements" who wanted to kidnap Barbie, reveal his CIC connections, and thus embarrass the United States. According to Vidal, CIC was by now "even more desirous of protecting Barbie," and Vidal complained to Lt. Whiteway that the Surete should "follow channels," by routing any requests through Whiteway. Lt. Whiteway apparently agreed with the CIC's characterization of the Surete's motives and tactics and he reportedly agreed to correct these "irregular approaches." Tab 57.)
Vidal, who monitored the French interrogation efforts for HQ CIC, maintained in May 1950 that "no mention was ever made by [French officials] that Barbie was wanted as a war criminal. All requests up to that time on the part of the French Surete and BDOC had been centered on Barbie as a material witness" in the Hardy case (emphasis original). Vidal's assertions in this respect are corroborated by a July 1949 report by Capt. Eugene Kolb, Operations Officer for the Region, who stated that French had given no "indication that [Barbie] was involved in war crimes." Tab 38. (Transcripts of these interrogations were not located in either U.S. or French archives.)
in retrospect, it is clear that by allowing French officials to have access to Barbie, CIC was taking a very great risk that its employment of Barbie would sooner or later become public, or at least widely known in the French government. But this risk did not appear to concern anyone; CIC's apprehension was only that Barbie's use might become known to the British, and embarrass CIC in British eyes.
The most reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that Vidal and Kolb were correct - that the French had given CIC no indication that Barbie himself was wanted, and thus there was no reason to hide him from French eyes. The conclusion that CIC had no indication at this point that Barbie was a suspected way criminal is supported by CIC's response to the events that were to follow - when the consequences of CIC's risk became very public indeed.
LONG STORY SHORT